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„Home high above and home deep down below?” 
Lending in Hungary
*
 
 Ádám Banai Júlia Király Márton Nagy 
In Hungary in the pre-crisis period the bank sector initiated private credit boom significantly 
contributed to the accumulation of economic imbalances. Nevertheless, before the 2008 crisis 
no special regulatory measure was taken to mitigate the FX lending to unhedged borrowers, 
which was one of the main moving force of the credit boom. Depreciation of the HUF and the 
increased risk premium significantly deteriorated the customers’ positions and resulted 
rocketing NPL-s. Recession, deteriorating portfolios, lack of efficient workout and the 
introduced strict regulation did freeze banking activity and the danger of recovery without 
lending did emerge. The paper compares the pre- and post-crisis lending activity and analyse 
both the lack of regulation in the pre-crisis and the inefficient regulation in the post-crisis 
period. 
Keywords: FX lending, macro prudential measures, credit growth, financial stability 
1. Introduction 
The transformation of the banking system in Hungary reached completion in the second half of the 
1990s. By then the vast majority of banks had been transferred to foreign owners. Owing in part to this 
structural specificity (i.e. the dominance of foreign banks1), retail2 lending in Hungary remained 
marginal until the turn of the millennium. Banks’ clientele was made up of primarily firms, not least 
because of the lack of a sound capital market to support corporate lending. The introduction of forint 
(HUF)-denominated, subsidized housing loans marked the first major change in lending trends. Since 
then, banks have focused increasingly on the retail segment. Moreover, the fierce competition for 
corporate clients helped to drive financial institutions in this direction. Household lending then saw a 
remarkably rapid boom, albeit with some disruptions, which endured until the onset of the crisis. 
Although the corporate loan portfolio also exhibited an accelerated growth rate, it didn’t match the 
pace of household lending. In autumn 2008 the spillover of the financial crisis to Hungary broke this 
upward trend in lending. The Hungarian banking system and the relevant government institutions were 
faced with a serious challenge as the previously accumulated risks materialized. 
Several papers have examined the consequences of the financial crisis both in Hungary and the region. 
Most of them focus on the channels of contagion identified during the crisis (Haas and Lelyveld, 
2009), while others concentrated on the buildup of liquidity risks and its impact during the crisis 
(Banai et al., 2010a). In this paper, we primarily address the developments of lending in Hungary. 
Besides providing an overview of the trends observed, we seek to determine whether there were any 
developments in either the household or the corporate segment that would have warranted state 
                                                     
*
 The views expressed in this essay are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the 
(i) Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary) or its management, (ii) World Bank and its affiliated 
organizations, or (iii) the Executive Directors of the World Bank and the governments they represent. This paper 
was prepared as background to a forthcoming World Bank report titled “Golden Growth: Restoring the Lustre of 
the European Economic Model.” All errors and omissions remain entirely the responsibility of the authors.  
1
 The expression ‘foreign banks’ refer to institutions with strategic foreign owner. It is not include majority 
foreign owned banks held in shares scattered among owners on the stock market (e.g. OTP Group, FHB Group) 
2
 Retail segment includes only household customers. 
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intervention in the period preceding the crisis. In addition, we present the challenges Hungarian 
authorities had to face as a result of the crisis and the tools they applied in efforts to overcome them. 
In our analysis we distinguish among three main periods. In the first part of section II we analyze 
lending in Hungary before 2004. The end of this period was marked by the turnaround observed in 
lending to households. This is the beginning of the foreign-exchange lending boom. The second part of 
the section addresses the upswing phase: the period stretching to the beginning of the crisis. In the rest 
of section II we present, first, the liquidity risks building up alongside lending risks and, second, a 
number of measures that, based on international experience, may be suitable for countering credit 
booms. In section III we describe the developments observed since the onset of the crisis – in 
particular, the challenges Hungary is faced with in the area of corporate and household lending. 
2. Precrisis lending: The accumulation of risks 
2.1. Period of convergence (from the beginning to 2004) 
In our analysis, one of the main questions is whether lending in Hungary was healthy in the observed 
periods. An excessive credit expansion may carry a number of risks. On the one hand, the expansion 
might be caused by increasing interbank competition. Shrinking margins may force banks to take 
bigger risks than before to maintain profitability. From the side of banks, credit expansion may thus 
lead to the buildup of a high-risk portfolio. On the other hand, credit expansion might be driven by 
unreasonably optimistic expectations regarding economic activity. This may result in excessive 
indebtedness and a jump in consumption. In emerging markets the rapid growth in lending is often 
accompanied by a significant appreciation of the local currency and soaring asset prices. The 
inevitable lending deceleration, in turn, generates a sharp fall in asset prices. As a result, the economy 
may sink into recession. In the worst-case scenario, the credit boom may trigger banking and currency 
crises with harsh adjustment consequences (IMF, 2004). 
2.1.1 Corporate segment 
Over the observed period, the structure of the domestic banking system was largely shaped by the 
competitive advantage local banks enjoyed when entering the retail market. In fact, nonresident market 
players did not make much of an effort to alter this situation (Móré and Nagy, 2004).  
The entry of foreign banks into the retail segment was limited by numerous factors besides the 
inherited competitive advantage of domestic banks. One such entry barrier was information 
asymmetry, which characterized household lending due to the short credit history of Hungarian 
households. Domestic banks were less affected by this problem, as their continuous participation 
provided them with far more information on customers. Those banks which were purchased by their 
foreign owners during the privatization process was not active in the retail segment before the 
privatization so they did not have that knowledge. The other important factor lies in the special needs 
of the household segment. In order to reach and adequately serve potential clients, a far more 
extensive branch network and staff capacity was needed than for the corporate segment (Móré and 
Nagy, 2004). For a long time, the associated high costs prevented foreign banks from entering this 
market or reinforcing their presence. 
Due to the retail market’s high entry costs, foreign banks focused initially on the corporate segment. 
Expansion in the corporate segment was supported by the arrival of multinational firms, the 
appearance of “home-host” relations in the corporate segment, and an upswing in external trade. 
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Moreover, foreign banks, which did not inherit low-quality corporate portfolios from the pretransition 
period and had experience in the field of commercial banking, could offer more favorable conditions 
overall than their domestic counterparts. Accordingly, until the beginning of the new millennium, 
participants of the Hungarian banking system were mainly engaged in corporate lending. In addition to 
government papers and receivables from the central bank, corporate loans were the most important 
contributors on the asset side (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Asset structure of the Hungarian banking system (1993–2004) 
 
Source: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) data. 
On the borrowers side, loans had/have a key role in funding firms. Owing to the underdeveloped 
capital market, the ratio of securities other than shares is still below 2 percent on the liability side of 
firms, and it has remained broadly unchanged since the transition. Accordingly, loans represent the 
main external liabilities. By the end of 2004, the share of loans on the liability side of the corporate 
sector rose to over 30 percent, compared to 18 percent at the beginning of the 1990s. Besides the 
domestic banking system, direct borrowings from abroad also contributed significantly to this growth. 
While they also represent a high share within net inflows, their magnitude should be handled with 
caution. Occasionally, the inflow of foreign funds may be related, for instance, to the liquidity 
management of foreign parent companies rather than the financing of business operations (Figure 2). 
Due to the high risks of a credit boom, several authors set out to examine whether the credit expansion 
experienced in certain countries entailed excessive credit growth or such growth in equilibrium. In 
relation to Hungary, Kiss et al. (2006) provided guidance as regards the soundness of the credit growth 
of the period before 2005. It is important for the purposes of our analysis that the study (for 
methodology see Box 1) reviews the corporate sector and the household sector separately. The period 
stretching to 2004 suggests that the ratio of corporate credit to gross domestic product (GDP) did not 
exceed the level justified by macroeconomic variables. We supplemented the chart presented in the 
study of Kiss et al. (2006) with the median of country constants. Considering it as an equilibrium path, 
the chart reveals that the corporate credit/GDP ratio was below the equilibrium level. At the same time, 
its dynamics deviated from that of the equilibrium path; its level gradually approached the equilibrium 
level (Figure 3). Nonetheless, based on the model, credit expansion cannot be considered excessive in 
the period under review.3 
                                                     
3
 The study does not take account direct borrowings from abroad, which distort the results somewhat. This 
notwithstanding, we believe that the conclusion holds true. 
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Figure 2: Net change in loans outstanding to nonfinancial corporations 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Note: “Banks” includes banks, branches, and cooperative credit institutions. Direct loans from abroad 
are not presented. The high volatility they typically exhibit is often unwarranted by real economic 
activity and merely reflects the internal liquidity management of the corporate group. The outstanding 
amount of direct foreign loans was marginally less than domestic loan volume. 
Figure 3: Estimation of equilibrium credit/GDP of nonfinancial corporations 
 
Source: Kiss et al. (2006); authors’ calculations. 
Note: we have plotted out the out-of-sample equilibrium levels with different country constants and 
also calculated a level based on the median of country constants. 
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Box 1: The identification methodology of equilibrium credit-to-GDP levels based on Kiss et al. 
The identification of the equilibrium credit-to-GDP levels is based on a two-step out-of-sample 
method. In the first step, eurozone data was employed for panel estimation using the pooled mean 
group (PMG) estimator. In the second step the estimated long-run parameters (structural relationship) 
was used for the calculation of the equilibrium level of Hungary’s credit-to-GDP.  
At the estimation it was assumed that the long-term relationship is the same in every examined 
country, but the short-term dynamics and the constant can differ across countries. Specifically it means 
that in the estimation of the equilibrium credit-to-GDP, the estimated parameters of the explanatory 
variables assumed to be the same; however the dynamics around the equilibrium, hence the constant in 
the equation are allowed to differ. The explanatory variables for the estimation of equilibrium credit-
to-GDP were the short-term real interest rate, the GDP and inflation. 
Finally, for Hungary we used the common long-term parameters on the Hungarian data. Choosing the 
country-specific constant was less straightforward. Therefore, we decided to plot out-of-sample 
equilibrium credit estimates using all country-specific effects. 
2.1.2 Retail segment 
During the transformation of the banking system in the 1990s, lending to households in Hungary was 
marginal. For the reasons described above, foreign-owned banks were not active in this market 
segment and household customers were mainly served by a handful of banks that remained under 
domestic ownership. Consequently, the net flow of credit to retail customers remained at very low 
levels until the turn of the millennium. The new millennium represented a turning point in the attitude 
of foreign banks present in Hungary. Fierce competition began to chip away at the profitability of the 
corporate segment, while positive growth prospects and households’ optimistic expectations generated 
burgeoning demand for banking products from the household segment. The newly established 
institutional conditions for mortgage lending, as well as the lower interest rates induced by the state-
subsidized housing loan system, also contributed to the pickup in lending. As a result of the latter, in 
the early 2000s new loan disbursements were dominated by state-subsidized forint loans. Retail 
foreign currency lending also appeared in Hungarian financial intermediation, although financial 
enterprises4 were the sole providers of this product at the time. Indeed, typically the financial 
enterprises of foreign-owned banks offered foreign-currency-denominated loans to households, mainly 
to finance vehicle purchases. Thanks to parent bank relations, the owner bank was able to provide 
them with the required foreign currency funds (Banai et al., 2010a). 
It was only in 2004 that foreign currency lending rose noticeably in banks’ mortgage lending. In 
response to news about a drastic tightening of the subsidy scheme on forint-denominated mortgage 
loans, 2003 saw a substantial surge in demand for this product. In 2004, however, a new product type 
– foreign-currency-denominated mortgage loans – played an essential role in maintaining the previous 
level of lending. Net credit flow in 2004 still fell short of the level observed in the previous year, and 
its structure changed as well: the share of foreign currency loans gained ground (Figure 4). The change 
in 2004 did not increase the vulnerability of the banking sector substantially in itself; however, it was 
apparent that its potential evolution into a trend could pose significantly increased risks to financial 
stability (MNB, 2004). 
                                                     
4
 Financial intermediaries that do not accept deposits but their main business is raising funds to lend (e.g. leasing 
companies) 
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Figure 4: Net change of loans outstanding to households by currency breakdown 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Note: “Banks” includes banks, branches, and cooperative credit institutions. 
As was the case with the analysis of corporate lending, we use the results of Kiss et al. (2006) to 
determine the occurrence of a credit boom in the household sector. Again, we supplemented the 
equilibrium paths based on country constants with a median path. The chart (Figure 5) reveals that in 
the case of households, the actual credit/GDP ratio exceeded the equilibrium level toward the end of 
the period, which can be attributed to two factors. On the one hand, as shown above, the announced 
tightening of the state subsidy scheme and the resulting borrowings brought forward to 2003 led to a 
surge in household indebtedness. On the other hand, while the growth rate of the loan portfolio 
decelerated in 2004, on the basis of macroeconomic variables, the model would have justified a 
decline in proportion to GDP. This deviation from the equilibrium path, however, can be still explained 
by convergence. In turn, it is hard to explain a decline in the equilibrium path driven by high nominal 
interest rates in the case of a transition economy. Consequently, in the review period there was no 
credit boom in the case of households; however, the risk of its emergence was greater in this sector 
than in the corporate sector. 
Figure 5: Estimation of equilibrium credit/GDP of households 
 
Source: Kiss et al. (2006); authors’ calculations. 
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2.2. Period of excessive credit expansion (2004–2008) 
2.2.1 Corporate segment 
2004 marked the end of the era of state-subsidized, forint-based housing loans previously dominant in 
household lending, and banks started to offer new, foreign-currency-denominated mortgage loan 
products. In corporate lending we could not identify such a clear-cut turning point. Indeed, this 
separation of the periods was justified by developments in household lending. The share of foreign-
currency-denominated loans within the total corporate portfolio was rather significant even before 
2004. This was a natural consequence of the fact that in a small, open economy such as Hungary’s, a 
large number of corporations have revenues in foreign currency; in other words, they have a natural 
hedge against exchange rate exposure. However, the share of foreign currency loans in net credit flow 
gradually increased between 2004 and 2008. The ratio of foreign currency loans to the total loan 
portfolio increased above 60 percent from around 40 percent in the observed period (Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Loans to non-financial corporations and ratio of FX loan to total corporate loans 
(2004–2008) 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Note: Adjusted for exchange rate effects. Foreign loans are not presented. The high volatility they 
typically exhibit is often unwarranted by real economic activity and merely reflects the internal 
liquidity management of the corporate group. 
This increasing dominance of foreign currency lending after 2004 could not be attributed any more 
simply to the hefty foreign currency revenues of the corporate sector. As the 2006 issue of the Report 
on Financial Stability (MNB, 2006) pointed out, an increasing portion of foreign currency loans was 
unhedged against exchange-rate risk. The analysis of micro, small, and medium-size enterprises 
appears to support this view. These companies are active mostly in the domestic market, and since 
their risk management is typically less sophisticated, they are often unhedged against exchange-rate 
risk when taking out foreign currency loans. This notwithstanding, 60 percent of long-term loans (with 
a contractual maturity of over one year) were denominated in foreign currency in the review period 
(Figure 7). This confirms the conclusion of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB). Thus, before setting out 
to examine the growth rate, we may conclude that borrowers without a natural hedge posed an 
increasing risk to the corporate portfolio. In case of an exchange-rate shock, this exchange rate risk 
represents an increasing credit risk for banks and hinders the growth of the real economy. 
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Figure 7: New disbursement of loans to SME sector broken down by currency 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Note: SME = small and medium-size enterprises. 
As in the previous section, we rely on Kiss et al. (2006) in our analysis of the risks associated with the 
credit growth. However, since the cited study does not cover our review period, we drew up the 
equilibrium paths until 2008 based on the method described in the study. The credit/GDP ratio fell 
short of the equilibrium level defined by the median even during the period ending in 2008. This 
suggests that corporate lending was not subject to excessive growth. 
As indicated above, actual level does not include direct foreign loans. For this reason, it is worth 
comparing the observed growth rate of credit/GDP with the growth rate of the indicator justified by the 
equilibrium path. Since the ratio of foreign direct loans to domestic loans is nearly constant, the 
dynamics of total loans (i.e. the sum of foreign loans and domestic loans) do not differ significantly 
from the dynamics of domestic loans. Another reason for doing this analysis is the fact that, owing to 
the large deviation of country constants, the definition of the equilibrium level is surrounded by 
greater uncertainty than that of the equilibrium dynamics. In addition, we also defined a rate of 
convergence.5 The result: average corporate credit growth was found to exceed the rate seen along the 
equilibrium path. Although, it was only marginally higher than the dynamics defined by the 
convergence path (Figure 8). Consequently, we cannot certainly say that there was a credit boom in 
corporate lending; most likely the rapid growth observed in this segment was driven mainly by the 
convergence process. However, due to the clients without a natural hedge, risks have built up in the 
corporate loan portfolio before the crisis. 
                                                     
5
 To this end, we examined how much time the countries examined in the model needed to reduce deviation from 
the equilibrium by half. We considered the result as an appropriate rate of convergence. Since the period 2004–
08 would have been too short for this analysis, we assumed that convergence started in 2000. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
20
04
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
05
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
06
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
07
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
08
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Per centHUF Bn
FX HUF Ratio of FX loans in total issuance Average
Crisis Aftermath: Economic policy changes in the EU and its Member States 
44 
Figure 8: Estimation of equilibrium credit/GDP and credit dynamics of nonfinancial 
corporations 
 
Source: Kiss et al. (2006); authors’ calculations. 
2.2.2 Retail segment 
The rise in retail foreign currency lending in 2004 was not an isolated phenomenon in the region. 
Therefore, numerous papers have been focused on its causes and consequences. Several of the papers 
dealt with the motivation of the demand side. Some conclude that one of the main reasons for foreign 
currency lending is the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates (Basso et al., 2007; 
Csajbók et al., 2010). However, a number of other factors may also contribute to the appearance and 
rise of foreign currency (FX) lending. In addition, Csajbók et al. demonstrate that the availability of 
long-term, fixed-interest-rate loans in domestic currency reduces the indebtedness of households in 
foreign currency. According to the study, willingness to borrow in foreign currency would likewise 
decline if the monetary regime did not exhibit a “fear of floating” behavior: in other words, if 
households had more experience in interest rate volatility. Last, it is important for banks to have access 
to long-term savings in domestic currency, which also facilitates home currency lending.  
Banai et al. (2010a) examine the motivations of the supply side. They argue that the expansion of 
foreign banks in the region and the nearly unlimited foreign currency liquidity also contributed to the 
rise of foreign currency lending. Indeed, large European parent banks provided their Hungarian 
subsidiaries with easy access to foreign currency financing. Moreover, striving to maintain their high 
profitability, banks appearing in the region were engaged in a risk-based competition for the household 
segment, which also encouraged foreign currency lending. 
In Hungary the main trigger of the upswing in retail foreign currency lending was the drastic cutback 
in the state subsidy on forint-denominated housing loans.6 This increased the interest rate differential 
between forint-denominated and foreign currency loans (in particular, Swiss francs – CHF7), which 
                                                     
6
 The study is not intended to examine either the reasons for the cutback, or its reasonability. 
7
 In Hungary the spread of CHF lending could be explained by the important role of Austrian banks. CHF-
denominated loans were popular products in Austria and the outstanding volume of CHF loans to non-bank 
sector is still the highest in Austria among EU countries. In Rumania, Austrian banks were not really active in 
the pre-crisis period until 2007. In Slovakia and Czech Republic, FX retail lending was not significant. Baltic 
States and Bulgaria maintain an exchange rate fixed to the EUR so EUR-denominated loans were more 
favourable than other FX products. In Poland, rapid growth of CHF lending slowed down due to tightening 
regulations. Nevertheless, the share of CHF loans in total loan portfolio is significant. 
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has been shown by previous research to be a driving force of foreign currency lending. Following its 
peak in 2003, the net flow of household loans declined temporarily in 2004; however, in 2006 it 
reached the 2003 level and continued to accelerate in 2007–2008 (Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Net change of loans outstanding to households by currency breakdown 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Note: “Banks” includes banks, branches, and cooperative credit institutions. 
A specificity of Hungarian foreign currency lending was the fact that loans to households were almost 
exclusively denominated in CHF (Figure 10). In an attempt to secure the largest possible market share, 
foreign-owned banks initially entered into cost-based competition, which was subsequently replaced 
by risk-based competition. CHF-denominated loans gained ground as a result of risk-based 
competition (Banai et al., 2010a). Looking at the data recorded before October 2008 (the escalation of 
the crisis), the HUF/EUR exchange rate was only slightly less volatile than that of the Swiss franc. In 
contrast, Swiss interest rate levels were invariably lower than those prevailing in the euro area. Based 
on the former data, the lower initial installment amount associated with the lower interest rate 
appeared attractive even amid slightly higher exchange rate volatility. However, this ignores the fact 
that the Swiss franc had appreciated continuously since the 1970s, albeit at a different pace and with 
slight interruptions: initially against the Deutsche mark, and later also against the euro. Moreover, 
those having recourse to this product did not consider that, being perceived by investors as a safe 
haven, demand for Swiss-franc-denominated assets would surge during a potential crisis (MNB, 
2010). Accordingly, in certain periods the volatility of the HUF/CHF exchange rate may significantly 
surpass that of the HUF/EUR exchange rate. Finally, debtors ignored the risk factor implied by the fact 
that the domestic monetary policy has little effect on the HUF/CHF exchange rate. 
As a last chapter in foreign currency lending in Hungary, already overshadowed by the looming crisis, 
some banks began to issue Japanese yen (JPY)-based mortgage loans in late 2007. Even before the 
crisis, the Japanese interest rate level had been close to zero for a protracted period, resulting in even 
lower initial installment amounts than those of Swiss franc loans. However, the fundamentals of the 
European and the Japanese economy are not closely related. Consequently, the volatility of the 
JPY/HUF exchange rate was considerably higher than that of the EUR/HUF or the CHF/HUF 
exchange rates. Although the MNB and the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) 
warned the banks of the risks as early as the beginning of 2008 (MNB, 2008), it was only the 
worsening of the crisis that would eventually put an end to this unfavorable trend (Figure 10). 
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Besides, the spread of FX-denominated products risks was exacerbated by loosening credit conditions 
and standards. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for mortgage loans increased constantly and in many 
cases exceeded 100 percent. The banking system’s average LTV ratio for the housing loan portfolio 
was above 70 percent at the end of 2008, while in 2004 it was only around 50 percent. The average 
payment-to-income ratio also increased, which was supported by the ever lower documented mortgage 
loans. Finally, increasing reliance on brokers as a sales channel also meant higher risks, because loans 
granted via their intermediation were characterized by significantly higher default rates (Banai et al., 
2010a). 
Figure 10: Currency structure of household loans 
 
Source: MNB data. 
The currency structure of the portfolio carried risks in itself. The question arises as to whether lending 
to households was affected by excessive credit expansion. As previously, we applied the method of 
Kiss et al. to find an answer. In the context of a sudden spike in lending, in 2003 the credit/GDP ratio 
rapidly reached the level of the equilibrium path. Owing to a moderate downturn in net flows in 2004-
2005, the level of the ratio at the end of 2005 was still only slightly above the equilibrium. In 2006, 
however, developments in the portfolio deviated from the path justified by macroeconomic variables 
both in terms of dynamics and level. This growth accelerated further in 2007-08. Therefore, during the 
two years preceding the crisis there was clearly a credit boom in the household segment. Besides the 
hidden risks associated with the poor currency structure, the size of the accumulating portfolio 
imposed an excessive burden on households. This implied mounting risks to their debt servicing 
capacity (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Net change in loans outstanding to households 
 
Source: Kiss et al. (2006); authors’ calculations. 
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2.3. Financing risks 
Owing to the credit boom and the currency structure of the loan portfolio, severe risks were building 
on the financing side as well. Since a number of studies (including Banai et al., 2010b) and several 
issues of the Report on Financial Stability have addressed this issue extensively, this paper is intended 
to merely touch upon the most important features. 
The upswing in lending naturally goes hand in hand with convergence. Ideally, however, banks are 
capable of financing loans from internal savings. Accordingly, the loan-to-deposit ratio should be 
around 100 percent. In early 2003 this equilibrium prevailed in the Hungarian banking system. By the 
end of the year, however, the ratio rose to 110 percent, as the phase out of subsidized forint loans 
generated a sharp rise in net flow. Against the backdrop of the lending surge, the ratio rose nearly 
continuously and reached 160 percent by the beginning of the crisis. The dynamics of the loan-to-
deposit ratio is in correlation with the share of foreign liabilities in the balance sheet. When the loan-
to-deposit ratio rises above 100 percent, external funds are needed to replenish deposit funds. 
Developments in foreign liabilities confirm our previous statements. While their share was around 17 
percent in proportion to the balance sheet total at the beginning of 2003, this value exceeded 30 
percent by the onset of the crisis.8 
Besides the increasing weight of foreign liabilities, risks were exacerbated by a growing reliance on 
the FX swap market. On the deposit side, Hungarian banks obtained liquidity predominantly in forint, 
which was conveniently used to close their open FX positions in the swap market. This allowed banks 
to obtain cheaper foreign currency liquidity. However, this meant higher funding liquidity risks. On 
the one hand, their excessive reliance on the swap market posed serious problems during times of 
market disturbances. On the other hand, foreign currency liquidity obtained in the swap market was 
generally of much shorter maturity than the on-balance sheet foreign currency funds, which increased 
renewal risks. Third, it led to a drastic contraction in the liquid assets portfolio of the banking system 
that serves to ensure that institutions are capable of meeting their obligations even in times of crisis. 
Despite all this, Hungary did not adopt any liquidity regulations aimed at mitigating these risks. 
Figure 12: Ratios describing the liquidity position of the banking sector 
 
Source: MNB data. 
                                                     
8
 The acceleration recorded in the last three months of 2008 primarily reflected parent banks’ intentions to 
strengthen balance sheets. 
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2.4. Regulations: Why not? 
As noted above, before the onset of the crisis, lending to households had carried serious risks both in 
terms of structure and volume, and had given rise to the accumulation of significant funding liquidity 
risks. This notwithstanding, Hungary did not adopt any regulatory measures aimed at the prevention of 
these negative developments. Below we attempt to find an explanation for this “inertia.” Why did the 
regulatory authorities fail to react despite the MNB’s nearly continuous warnings about the risks of 
foreign currency lending since the 2004 issue of its Report on Financial Stability? (For the legal 
relationship of institutions responsible for the financial stability, see Box 2) 
We attempt to determine the pros and cons that may have been weighed as potential regulatory 
measures were contemplated. First, we examine the general consequences of regulations taken in 
response to rapid FX loan expansion from the perspective of macroeconomic and financial stability. 
We proceed to examine the advantages and disadvantages of individual regulatory measures. We 
structure the potential regulatory tools in line with Hilbers et al. (2005), also taking into account 
country-specific features. 
Box 2: The role of institutions responsible for financial stability in Hungary 
There are three different institutions (Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary), Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Authority, Ministry for National Economy), in Hungary which are responsible 
for the financial stability. The legal relationship of the institutions is determined by the Central Bank 
Act (Act LVIII of 2001).  
The MNB (central bank of Hungary), in cooperation with other competent authorities, shall support 
and shall contribute to the development and smooth conduct of policies related to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and to the stability of the financial intermediation system: it shall 
expose business and economic risks to the financial intermediation system on the whole, help to 
prevent the development of systemic risks, and to reduce or terminate systemic risks that may already 
exist. The President of the MNB may submit legislative proposals to the Government or proposals for 
initiating the legislative process, or to any member of the Government for adopting new regulations.  
The microprudential supervisory power rests with the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(HFSA), while the regulatory power is at the Ministry for National Economy. Based on this collective 
responsibility a new regulation taking effect on January 1st, 2010 established the Financial Stability 
Council (FSC) as consultative forum. Under its mandate high level representatives of the three 
authorities meet on a quarterly basis to discuss financial stability issues. The Council also has the right 
to call for formal regulation on a comply-or-explain basis.  
Under the Act on HFSA (Act of 2007/CXXXV.) this authority is mandated to collaborate with the 
central bank in mitigating and managing systemic risk. Since January 1st, 2010 the authority has the 
right to temporarily (90 days) suspend services, activities or trading at sectoral level in pre-emptive 
nature whenever any of these activities threat systemic stability.  
In conclusion, while the central bank is entitled with financial stability oversight, it has no regulatory 
power, so to mitigate the identified risk it has to consult the two other authorities (the Ministry of 
National Economy and the HFSA) in the format of the Financial Stability Council so as to initiate any 
regulatory measure or supervisory intervention. 
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2.4.1 Macroeconomic impact 
Over the short term, restricting foreign currency lending or making it more expensive temporarily 
reduces the household sector demand, depending on the substitutability between forint-denominated 
loans and foreign currency loans. The weakening of household demand reduces the external financing 
requirement, decelerating economic growth somewhat. In the short run, the deceleration leads to the 
deterioration of profitability in certain segments of the corporate sector. As such, the adoption of a 
regulatory measure during the credit boom would have been an extremely sensitive issue politically. 
From 2006, on the back of the fiscal adjustments, the income position of households deteriorated, 
which households tried to offset by borrowing. Nevertheless, economic growth took a significant 
downturn. Had lending to households been restricted by regulatory measures, this downturn would 
probably have been even more pronounced (Figure 13). Eventual accession to the euro area some 
years later also meant a regular counterargument. Exchange rate risk would not have been eliminated 
totally with this while most of the loan portfolio is denominated in CHF. 
Figure 13: Real GDP growth, net financing capacity, and net credit flow of households 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Moreover, in the short run, the tightening of foreign currency lending would have resulted in higher 
yields and a weaker exchange rate, since households would have borne only a smaller part of the 
exchange-rate risk associated with the financing of the current account deficit. But over the long term, 
the prevention of a credit boom promotes a sounder growth structure. 
2.4.2 Impact on the financial intermediary system 
The most notable risk posed by the tightening of foreign currency lending is its short-term impact on 
banks’ portfolio quality. Raising the cost of foreign currency loans and the depreciation of the 
exchange rate would have caused a sharp rise in installment amounts, increasing customers’ 
probability of default. As an additional risk, in the case of housing loans, the fall in credit supply 
resulting from waning demand for foreign currency loans and portfolio deterioration may have 
generated excess supply and hence price devaluation in the real estate market.  
Again, over the long term, the positive effects appear to be dominant. Financial stability is reinforced, 
on the one hand, by the moderation of the indirect credit risk assumed by the banking system as a 
consequence of the exchange rate risk of customers and, on the other hand, by the reduced 
vulnerability of the economy—that is, the improved external balance. 
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2.4.3 Assessment of specific measures 
Below we provide a brief overview of a number of relevant tools applied in international practice for 
the purpose of restraining excessive foreign currency lending. In addition, we examine the arguments 
that may have been considered in favor of or against such tools during the time of the Hungarian credit 
boom. 
1) Monetary measures: As the central bank and the financial supervisory authority are two 
separate institutions in Hungary, the best tool the central bank can use to impose restrictions 
on foreign currency lending is a change in the parameters of reserve requirements. The central 
bank may increase the cost of foreign currency loans by defining a higher reserve requirement 
or a lower interest rate (or both) on foreign currency liabilities. The disadvantage of this 
measure is that it is easily circumvented by banks through the creation of synthetic FX 
position (for example, forint funding combined with FX swap or currency forward 
transaction). In this case financial derivatives would have to be subjected to reserve 
requirements as well. However, besides making even transactions unrelated to foreign 
currency lending expensive, such a step could also have significant market effects. Banks may 
also try to avoid the brunt of the negative effects by selling certain components of the portfolio 
to other members of the same bank group (as we have seen in international practice). Finally, 
modifying the rules of reserve requirements would have represented a step backward in the 
harmonization of European monetary policy instruments. 
2) Administrative measures: good examples of these instruments include a total ban or 
restrictive limits on loans unhedged against exchange-rate risk. The adoption of such measures 
limits or completely restrains foreign currency lending, but only temporarily. Such harsh 
interventions encourage evasion and intensify cross-border financial intermediation. Posing a 
severe threat to stability, the sharp decline in new loans could drastically deteriorate banks’ 
profitability. This would also be detrimental to interbank competition and bank efficiency. 
Recourse to such tools is not only incompatible with European practice, it is not a typical 
course of action in developed countries either, which serves as an argument against the 
adoption of such measures. 
3) Prudential measures: 
o Higher capital requirements: several countries relied on this tool in an attempt to raise the 
costs of foreign currency loans, and hence impose a restriction on such lending. As regards 
Hungary, this idea was generally viewed as ineffective, given the extremely high capital 
adequacy ratio prevalent in the banking system even before the crisis. In addition, it was 
generally agreed that a measure like this would encourage transformation of subsidiaries 
of foreign banks into branch offices or steer lending toward nonbank financial 
intermediaries. 
o Tightening banks’ net open FX position limits: on the one hand, this may somewhat raise 
the cost of foreign currency loans; on the other hand, it may reduce the maturity risks 
stemming from synthetic positions. At the same time, the measure would reduce the risk of 
banks’ excessive reliance on a specific financial market. However, it appeared doubtful 
whether such a step would yield any noticeable change. In addition, it may have hindered 
the development of financial markets. 
o Tighter nonprice minimum eligibility criteria (LTV, payment-to-income—or PTI): as we 
have seen, these ratios increased permanently in Hungary before the crisis. With carefully 
chosen limits, such a step could reduce lending in foreign currency; moreover, it would 
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affect the riskiest segments. However, even this measure could be circumvented by taking 
advantage of cross-border services. 
o Asset-side liquidity ratios: this would include the mandatory holding of certain assets as a 
percentage of the balance sheet total, liquid funds or own funds. On the one hand, this 
makes lending more expensive; on the other hand, it facilitates the holding of more 
substantial liquidity buffers, which in turn increases shock-absorbing capacity. However, it 
is detrimental to growth, as the requirement is to hold liquid assets rather than loans. 
o Maturity mismatch regulations: these are designed to prevent excessive reliance on short-
term funds, thereby making lending more costly. Regulations of this type imply a pressure 
to create a healthier balance sheet structure, which reduces financing risks. They succeed 
in curbing excessive credit expansion only if “term premia” are not too marginal. 
4) Fiscal measures: 
o Imposing taxes on unhedged foreign currency lending is the most obvious option in this 
group of instruments. As a result, this type of lending becomes more expensive and less 
attractive. However, its disadvantage is that it withdraws funds from the institutions 
performing high-risk activities, further deteriorating their financial position.  
o Elimination of lending-related state subsidies for these types of loans is another fiscal 
option. As a result of this step, loans become more expensive and thus loan issuance 
would indeed decline. It would be a hard sell, however, from a political perspective. 
As we have seen, a wide variety of tools were available through which Hungary could have attempted 
to restrain excessive foreign currency lending. Although each measure had certain disadvantages, these 
were not always convincing as arguments against the specific regulation. While the applicability of 
monetary policy instruments was questionable, some of the prudential or fiscal measures could have 
been helpful. However, in these considerations more significance was attached to short-term negative 
growth effects than to long-term benefits. 
3. Lending after Lehman: Regulatory measures and future challenges 
In the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the global financial crisis escalated in 
Hungary as well as elsewhere. Practically all investors fled from markets deemed risky, posing a threat 
to both public financing and the financing of the banking system in Hungary. As a consequence of the 
country’s significant need for international funding and the extreme vulnerability this entailed, the 
exchange rate depreciated substantially and, in the wake of the crisis, key financial markets (mainly 
government securities, FX swap and interbank markets) dried up. 
In an effort to manage the liquidity crisis, steps were taken by the government and the central bank 
(for further details, see Appendix 1.). Besides ensuring the usual local currency funding MNB played 
the role of ‘FX lender of last resort’. Stabilising the situation was impossible without the intervention 
of parent banks. They did not decrease but increased their exposure towards the country during the 
most intensive period of the crisis. At the same time, banks undertook large-scale adjustments. 
Initially, the corporate loan portfolio began to shrink, followed by a contraction in household lending. 
Thanks to the adjustments and the assistance received from parent banks, the banking system 
weathered the brunt of the first few months of the crisis. Confidence about the country gradually 
improved in the course of 2009. 
Nonetheless, the underlying risks of the loan portfolio materialized as a consequence of the economic 
recession. Amid a continuous deterioration in the quality of the loan portfolio, banks suffered 
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increasing loan losses. Profitability was further deteriorated by the bank levy. Examples of such 
windfall tax can be found in other countries but the extent of the Hungarian one far exceeds the levies 
applied or planned in other countries. The major share of the levy applies to credit institutions, 
calculated based on their modified total assets for 2009. The levy is determined as 0.15 per cent of the 
tax base under HUF 50 billion and 0.5 per cent of the tax base above that. As a result, in 2010, 
profitability of the Hungarian banking sector was lower than in the countries of the parent banks and 
other countries of the region (except for the Baltic countries). Without the bank levy Hungary would 
be in the leader’s group of Europe. If this low profitability remains for a longer period, in addition to 
banks’ weakening ability to accumulate internal capital, Hungarian banks may suffer a competitive 
disadvantage in the allocation of parent banks’ funds and capital (MNB, 2011). 
Figure 14: ROE indicators of banking sector in international comparison 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Consequently, even as banks’ liquidity position recovered gradually, their capital positions became a 
crucial issue on account of deteriorating profitability. While banks’ capital positions remained safe 
from a stability perspective, the banking system has failed to support economic growth. 
3.1. Corporate lending: Future challenges 
In the initial period of the crisis, banks responded to mounting liquidity problems primarily by cutting 
back corporate lending. This was justified by several factors. As the average residual maturity of the 
corporate loan portfolio is significantly shorter than that of loans to households, in the short run it 
allows more robust adjustments on the part of banks. Since competition is much stronger in the 
corporate segment in the Hungarian banking system, margins are tighter and banks’ profits are smaller 
on these loans. Finally, corporate loans usually have higher capital requirements than the mortgage 
loans constituting the bulk of the household portfolio.  
From the last quarter of 2008, the corporate segment recorded a negative credit flow in each 
subsequent quarter. Although the economy started to recover as early as end-2009, this trend of 
negative credit flows continued throughout 2010. Contrary to developments observed in the region, 
economic growth has so far not been followed by a recovery in lending. Banks’ loan supplies remain 
restrained for two reasons. On the one hand, banks’ risk appetite remains low; on the other hand, 
reflecting the deterioration in the portfolio and the very high bank levy, capital buffers decreased, 
curbing lending ability. According to the forecast of the MNB, corporate lending is not expected to 
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pick up until late 2011 (Figure 15). Without a pickup in lending, the recovery of the economy may 
remain weak and fragile (MNB, 2011). 
Figure 15: Net change in loans outstanding to nonfinancial corporations 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Note: “Banks” includes banks, branches, and cooperative credit institutions. 
As seen above, we cannot say that credit expansion in the corporate sector was excessive. Although 
risks were exacerbated by the currency structure of the loan portfolio, we have not found evidence of a 
problem similar in magnitude to that encountered in the household segment. Nonetheless, against the 
backdrop of the drastic downturn in the economy, the quality of the corporate loan portfolio 
deteriorated substantially. This, in turn, was reflected in the mounting losses on the portfolio, which 
impairs the lending ability of the banking system even further. Thus, the greatest challenge lies neither 
in changing the structure of the portfolio nor in controlling credit expansion; first and foremost, efforts 
must be made to revive lending, and the government should be involved in this process (e.g. interest 
rate subsidies, guarantee etc.). The difficulty is that the room for fiscal maneuver is fairly limited due 
to Hungary’s high public debt and former high budget deficit levels. Since it is mainly a supply 
problem (Sóvágó, 2011), the goal is to reduce the risks assumed by banks. A possible way to achieve 
this goal is the provision of state guarantees. Such programs already exist in Hungary; moreover, more 
than 20 percent of the loans extended to the SME sector are backed by state guarantee through 
Garantiqa Zrt (Figure 16). In view of the success of this program, similar options should be explored 
and aimed at supporting the revival of lending (MNB, 2011). 
Figure 16: Loans outstanding to the SME sector backed by the guarantee of Garantiqa Zrt 
 
Source: MNB data. 
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3.2. Household lending: Regulatory measures 
Although the household loan portfolio continued to grow in the last quarter of 2008, albeit at a slower 
pace, net flow turned negative in 2009. The negative effects of the financial crisis became increasingly 
obvious for households, as well, and was gradually perceived in their income position. In addition, 
rising installments, due to the weakening of the forint, made households more cautious. Nonetheless, 
this did not make forint-denominated loans more attractive, given the persistently high levels of forint 
interest rates. Thus, precautionary considerations became dominant on the supply side as well. Several 
banks removed CHF-denominated loans from their product range at the beginning of the crisis, while 
others severely tightened credit conditions. Net lending was, therefore, already negative throughout 
2009. 
Household lending remained weak in 2010. New disbursement was partly moderated by regulatory 
changes introduced during the year (see in details later). Moreover, the precautionary considerations of 
households intensified. In the course of 2010 the Swiss franc strengthened against the forint 
significantly, leading to a sharp increase in the debt-servicing burdens of households. Meanwhile, the 
labor market environment remained unfavorable. Consequently, despite their frail income positions, 
the households had to spend increasing amounts on debt service, which drastically decreased their 
willingness to borrow. As regards banks, lending was inhibited mainly by the rapidly deteriorating 
portfolio. Through the deterioration of the capital position, substantial loan losses are also detrimental 
to household lending. Accordingly, based on the MNB’s forecast, lending is not expected to start 
recovering until the second half of 2012 (Figure 17).  
Figure 17: Net change in loans outstanding to households 
 
Source: MNB data. 
Note: “Banks” includes banks, branches, and cooperative credit institutions. 
The delayed turning point in household lending is part of the inevitable adjustment process. The main 
risk in this regard is not the downturn in lending but the rapid deterioration of the portfolio. As 
unsecured loans are associated with weaker willingness to repay, primarily it was these loans that went 
delinquent at the beginning of the crisis. However, in 2009 the quality of mortgage loans – which 
constitute the bulk of the loan portfolio – also began to deteriorate with increased installment amounts 
resulting from unfavorable exchange rate and interest rate developments combined with a negative 
labor market environment. This not only worsens banks’ stability and lending ability, it also generates 
severe social tensions. To tackle the problem, the Government adopted a moratorium on evictions from 
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the properties serving as collateral for nonperforming loans as early as 2009. After several extensions, 
the eviction and foreclosure moratorium remained in effect until July 2011. However, this regulation 
merely addresses the social aspect of the problem, and it further aggravates banks’ situation. On the 
one hand, the law has clearly reduced willingness to repay; on the other hand, it forces banks to keep 
bad debts on their balance sheets and finance them (Figure 18). 
Figure 18: 90+ delinquency ratio for certain retail product types 
 
Source: MNB data. 
3.2.1 Regulatory measures 
Drawing from the experience of the crisis, several regulatory initiatives have been announced and 
implemented with an impact on lending to households. In light of the problems presented above, these 
initiatives had two objectives. One is to ensure the formation of a sounder lending structure as lending 
recovers. Forint-denominated loans came into the forefront with a simultaneous, drastic cutback on 
foreign currency loans, while authorities strive to pressure banks to assume less risk even in the case 
of forint loans. The other main objective is to provide better protection to borrowers. Indeed, banks 
used to have an option to raise interest rates on loans at will, and as a consequence, changes in the 
installment amounts were not predictable to customers. On occasion, this mechanism may have 
contributed to the deterioration of the portfolio. 
Below we examine the regulatory initiatives that have been implemented in Hungary since the onset of 
the crisis. In some cases we also present their short-term impacts. 
1) Transparent pricing (step 1): Ever since the gradual expansion in household lending, the fact 
that banks could unilaterally modify the terms of retail loan agreements had been an 
unresolved problem. After several proposals, the first step was taken in 2009. Banks were 
required by law to provide a cause-and-effect list in their loan agreements as to what entitles 
them to raise interest rates, fees, or charges. At the same time, the law entitled debtors to 
prepay their loans free of charge for a duration of 60 days from the date of an unfavorable, 
unilateral contract amendment (either by refinancing their loan or by taking out a new loan 
from a different provider). Market players—who denounced the legislation change and tended 
to stick to the regulation to the letter while they essentially evaded its spirit—inserted 
tediously long lists into their terms and conditions, which entitled the institutions, for instance, 
to raise their interest rates even on the grounds of rising marketing expenses. In addition, the 
long lists did not specify the extent to which transaction rates were to be modified if the listed 
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reasons materialized (for example, the percentage point by which interest rates were to be 
raised in case of a specific increase in marketing expenses). This counteracted the legislative 
intent pertaining to transparent pricing. 
2) Transparent pricing (step 2): In light of the failure of the previous attempt, with the 
coordination of the HFSA, banks finally worked out a Code of Conduct, effective January 1, 
2010, under which they committed themselves to exercise moderation regarding their 
unilateral pricing range. In essence, this translated into a moderate shortening of the cause-
and-effect lists. The Government adopted the Code of Conduct and even passed a legislative 
amendment to incorporate it into the legislation. According to the amendment, creditors have 
to define their pricing principles in writing, providing an exhaustive list of all the factors on 
the basis of which they are entitled to unilaterally modify interest rates, fees, or charges at the 
expense of the customer. Fees or charges may be raised annually by the rate of inflation at 
most (even though these fees are typically expressed in percentage), and the Code of Conduct 
includes a consensual “sample” of the cause-and-effect list defined in the pricing principles 
legitimizing interest rate raises. Based on this, lenders can pass, at nearly any time, three types 
of risks on to their customers by unilateral contract modification: changes in the regulatory 
environment (changes affecting business activity, that is, changes to legislation, taxes, reserve 
ratios, and deposit insurance fees); increased cost of funding; and an increase in customer 
risk. Since this continues to leave ample room for banks to modify interest rates on loans, the 
criterion of transparency barely improved. 
3) Activity of brokers: The activity of brokers also played an important role in the upswing in 
lending. During the years of the crisis it became clear that the rapid deterioration of the 
portfolio was partly attributable to the activity of brokers, as they enabled riskier customers to 
enter the lending process (MNB, 2008). It thus became important to tighten the previously 
loose regulations related to their activity. One of the objectives of the regulation was to define 
the various types of lending intermediaries. The classification is based on the entity on whose 
behalf they act. Further objectives were reducing the intermediation chains, tightening 
brokers’ working criteria (e.g. license), preventing a conflict of interest (e.g. regulation of 
remuneration).  
4) Prudent lending: The central element of the regulation is that it defined differentiated LTV 
limits for retail mortgages, vehicle financing loans, and home leases. In the case of mortgage 
loans, the LTV limit is 75 percent for forint-denominated loans; 60 percent for euro-
denominated loans, and 45 percent for loans denominated in other currencies (for example, 
CHF). As regards vehicle financing loans and home leases, the regulation is less strict; their 
limits are 80 percent, 65 percent, and 50 percent, respectively. Another important element of 
the regulation requires banks to set up creditworthiness limits based on the assessment of the 
creditworthiness of individual loan applicants in proportion to monthly income. As a result of 
the regulation, the ratio of foreign currency loans to new mortgage loans fell below 10 percent. 
Nevertheless, the total gross flow, which had already been extremely low because of the crisis, 
did not change significantly. The regulation appeared to provide sufficient restrictions in the 
event of an upsurge in lending (Figure 19). 
5) Ban on foreign currency mortgage lending: Despite the success of the regulation aimed at 
facilitating prudent lending, in mid-August 2010 a law came into effect prohibiting registering 
a mortgage on real estate in the Land Register if it is based on a mortgage loan contract in 
foreign currency by natural persons. The effect of this act was rather negligible, given that 
foreign currency mortgage loans had practically disappeared already on the back of the act on 
prudent lending. 
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6) Enhancement of the mortgage bond market: As the study by the Csajbók et al. (2010) 
demonstrated, the lack of availability of long-term, fixed-interest-rate loans in domestic 
currency reduces the possibility of an upsurge in foreign currency lending. This requires long-
term forint savings. In addition, the crisis proved that a reason for the vulnerability of the 
Hungarian economy is the lack of long-term forint savings. With that in mind the central bank 
took steps to enhance the forint-denominated mortgage bond market. In this context it 
launched a mortgage bond purchase program with the intention of purchasing mortgage bonds 
in the primary and secondary markets at a value of HUF 100 billion at most. With these steps 
the MNB wanted to improve the covered bond market which may have positive effects on the 
demand of these securities. 
7) A proposal package aimed at reducing banks’ abuse of dominant economic position for 
the protection of distressed customers: The package adopted at the end of 2010 increased 
the rights of borrowers in certain aspects while it strived to improve the transparency of 
pricing; however, it failed to achieve real changes. The points accepted include the following: 
o In respect of housing loans, only interest rates can be modified by banks unilaterally, and 
strictly for predefined reasons (service fees and other charges cannot be modified9). These 
reasons, however, did not materially curtail banks’ leeway. 
o In case of foreign-currency-denominated loans, banks are required to apply either the 
central bank’s or their own mid-rate. (In other words, banks may not use the FX sell rate 
for calculating the installment amount). 
o As regards loans for house purchases, the law set the upper limit of prepayment fees at 1.5 
percent, while it abolished prepayment fees altogether for loans under HUF 1 million, 
provided that the customer had no prepayment in the previous 12 months. 
o Pursuant to the regulation, once every five years customers may request the extension of 
maturity of housing loans free of charge. 
o Under the new law, in the case of housing loans, 90 days after termination of the contract 
on a defaulting loan banks may not charge late payment interest, only their normal 
transaction interest. 
Figure 19: New issuance of household mortgage loans by currency 
 
Source: MNB data. 
 
                                                     
9
 The former regulation (point 2) still stands for home equity loans. 
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The measures adopted thus far were conducive to ensuring that once lending recovers it will be 
healthier both in terms of volume and structure relative to precrisis practices. However, the risk of 
returning to the irresponsible precrisis foreign currency lending practices could be reduced further. 
While the prevailing regulations prohibit purely collateral-based lending, they allow a wide margin for 
the income-based creditworthiness limit. It would be advisable, therefore, to introduce significantly 
stricter PTI limits. While the LTV limit primarily protects banks, rather than customers, from 
substantial losses, the PTI limit would mainly protect debtors from excessive risk exposure. The 
existing regulations have not resolved the problems related to the lack of transparency in pricing. 
Therefore, the pricing of loan products should be subjected to more stringent regulations, for example, 
through the mandatory introduction of products with an interest rate fixed for a longer interest period, 
or products with fixed premium and variable interest rates (MNB, 2011). 
3.3. Basel III, as a future challenge 
Above, we addressed the regulatory measures adopted heretofore, explicitly designed to tackle 
country-specific problems. However, in our review of macroprudential measures we cannot ignore the 
fact that, as a result of a joint, international effort, the Basel Committee (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, or BCBS) has put forward its recommendation package to be implemented with CRD IV 
and CRR10 in member states across the European Union, including Hungary. Although the exact form 
of European implementation is not known, a few key issues should be highlighted. 
The primary objective of the new capital regulation is to ensure that banks have capital at their 
disposal in sufficient quantity and quality, thereby improving the shock-absorbing capacity of banking 
systems. According to the Basel recommendations, banks’ capital requirements consist of three 
components: a minimum amount of regulatory capital, a mandatory capital conservation buffer, and a 
counter-cyclical capital buffer designed to mitigate the pro-cyclical nature of banks’ behavior. 
Therefore, the capital requirements of banks increased significantly; moreover, more stringent capital 
definition was imposed. However, to achieve the targeted levels, banks have a rather long period of 
adjustment at their disposal: maximum levels are expected to be achieved by 2019. We do not expect 
this change to pose significant problems for Hungarian banks. The Hungarian banking system has had 
fairly high capital adequacy levels even before, mainly constituted by capital components of the 
highest quality. 
However, the introduction of the two liquidity ratios is a more important issue in light of the financing 
risks described above. The objective of the LCR (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) is to ensure that banks can 
meet their obligations even during a 30-day severe stress scenario; in other words, they must maintain 
a liquid asset buffer of sufficient size. As described above, banks’ liquid assets diminished before the 
crisis and, consequently, the banking system initially faced the crisis without an adequate liquidity 
buffer at its disposal. This demonstrates that the regulation is aimed at containing risks relevant to the 
Hungarian banking system. The liquidity position of the Hungarian banking system has improved 
significantly since the beginning of the crisis. (For example, the ratio of liquid assets to balance sheet 
total increased to 15 per cent from 7 percent.) This notwithstanding, meeting the minimum liquidity 
coverage ratio might still be difficult for certain financial institutions—partly because of real, existing 
risks and partly because the regulation attempts to apply uniform standards to very different types of 
banking systems. A good example of the former is reliance on the swap market, which has not 
decreased despite the fact that it represented a severe risk during the crisis. The cash outflow resulting 
from the exchange rate shock reflected in the ratio is a phenomenon also observed in Hungarian 
                                                     
10
 For details see: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm  
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practice. This therefore justifies the maintenance of a liquidity buffer. However, the handling of parent 
bank funds as simple interbank funds and the inordinately strict criteria applied to the use of the 
preferential weighting of corporate deposits’ outflow could create unnecessary difficulties for 
Hungarian banks. 
NSFR (Net Stable Funding Ratio), the second liquidity ratio, aims to reduce maturity mismatches in 
banks’ balance sheets. Therefore, achieving the expected level of the ratio will be made difficult by the 
recently observed developments in Hungary. Short-term external funds have gained an increasingly 
important role within external funding. At the same time, the ratio of funds with short residual 
maturity has gained ground within the balance sheet (MNB, 2011). While the occurrence of this 
change is not limited to Hungary, it represents a risk.  
In short, certain banks may encounter difficulties in trying to meet the liquidity criteria. The 
adjustment process of Hungarian credit institutions may have serious impacts on the real economy, and 
the later they begin the adjustment, the greater the impact will be. It is important, therefore, to consider 
country-specific features in the course of European implementation, and not to force banks to make 
bigger adjustments than warranted by the risks. 
4. Conclusions 
The crisis, which began in 2007, had a strong impact on the Hungarian economy. More than two years 
after the escalation of the crisis, the loan portfolio of the private sector was still on the decline in 
Hungary, and it appears now that the recovery of lending may not be expected until the end of 2011 in 
the corporate sector, and even later in the household sector. The current negative developments can be 
attributed to the rapid external indebtedness preceding the crisis and the growing vulnerability of the 
country. Despite a significant improvement in its economic position, Hungary is still considered a 
risky area and is treated by banks with greater caution. Moreover, as the risks accumulated during the 
precrisis period materialized (and the bank levy was imposed on banks), the profitability, and hence, 
the lending ability of the banking system deteriorated sharply. 
The analysis of the past 10 years or so sheds light on what led the Hungarian economy to its current 
situation. When the modern Hungarian banking system came into existence, the banking business 
focused mainly on corporate lending. By the late 1990s, fierce competition developed among banks in 
this segment. As regards firms, demand for bank financing arose due to the lack of a functioning 
capital market (e.g. the ratio of securities other than shares is still below 2 percent on the liability side 
of firms). While the indebtedness of firms was a rapid process, it was consistent with the convergence 
of the Hungarian economy. The main risk factor was the growing share of foreign currency loans 
within the portfolio. The substantial foreign currency loan portfolios, particularly FX loans extended to 
the SME sector, suggest that borrowers did not always have sufficient foreign currency income to 
serve as a natural hedge. 
Lending to households evolved differently relative to the corporate sector. Until the beginning of the 
2000s, households were practically not linked to financial intermediaries on the liability side. 
However, the newly offered, state-subsidized forint-loans proved to be attractive, leading to a sharp 
surge in the household loan portfolio, particularly in the period 2002-2003. After a drastic cutback of 
the subsidy in 2003, this loan product became far less attractive from 2004 onward. The response of 
the banking system was nearly instantaneous, with the offering of a new product. Banks started to 
provide foreign-currency-based mortgage loans to their customers. The product was an instant success. 
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From 2005 the indebtedness of the households exceeded the growth rate that would have been justified 
by the convergence, and the period 2007-2008 was characterized by a credit boom. 
Nevertheless, regulatory measures were not taken until the period of the crisis. The lack of action can 
be attributed to growth sacrifice and the uncertainty surrounding the efficiency of the potential 
measures. The crisis harshly revealed the magnitude of the accumulated risks. Considerations about 
household lending, therefore, focus on two central issues. First, after the recovery, what can be done to 
promote sounder lending practice, both in terms of structure and volume? Second, what can be done to 
assist distressed debtors? As regards corporate lending, a different question has come to the forefront. 
What can a government do to boost lending when, at the same time, it is constantly forced to make 
fiscal adjustments? 
The past two years have seen significant changes in the regulatory environment of household lending. 
In line with the objectives described above, prudential tools have been applied, while transparency and 
the protection of customers were reinforced. Meanwhile, efforts are being made to facilitate lending to 
the corporate sector by guarantee schemes. The implementation of the Basel III recommendation 
package may moderate financing risks; however, there are still uncertainties about the expected 
effects.  
The painful experiences of the crisis demonstrated that an excessive upsurge in lending inevitably 
leads to some degree of weakening in growth momentum. It is a matter of decision, however, whether 
this is set in motion in a coordinated manner, by regulatory measures, or triggered by a crisis. 
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Appendix I.: Main measures applied to maintain the stability of the 
banking system 
MNB reactions: 
Increased the liquidity surplus to support banks’ HUF liquidity needs 
– Purchasing government bonds (in the last quarter of 2008),  
– New lending facilities (2-week and 6-month loan from October 2008) 
– Broadening collateral base from November 2008 (municipal bonds, covered bonds, 
minimum rating: BBB-) 
– Reducing reserve requirement (from 5% to 2% in December 2008), modifiable 
required reserve ratio from November 2010 
– Increasing FX-reserves (FX loans from EU, IMF) 
FX-swap facilities supported with swap line 
– Supporting FX liquidity need of the banks and enhancing transmission mechanism 
through normalised implied HUF rates in FX- swap market 
• Overnight EUR/HUF FX-swap tender (two simultaneous possibility from 
October 2008, the two-way overnight EUR/HUF FX-swap tender was 
suspended in May 2009) 
• 1 week CHF/EUR FX-swap (from February 2009 till January 2010) 
• 3-month and 6-month EUR/HUF FX-swap (from March 2009, 6-month 
facility was suspended in July 2010) 
Government steps: 
– Direct state loan from the government to banks not having strategic foreign owner 
from IMF loan (OTP, MFB, FHB)  
– Setting up a capital injection and guarantee scheme from IMF loan (pre-emptive 
actions)  
International support: 
– International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission (EC), World Bank 
program (from November 2008): under the agreement Hungary got access to a 
standby credit  
– facility of up to EUR 20 billion 
– Vienna Initiative (from March 2009): a dialogue between International Financial 
Institutions (IMF, WB, EBRD, EIB, IFC) and commercial banks active in the region 
so as to ensure coordination on cross-border issues and continued lending to the 
region. Parent banks accepted not to decrease their country exposure. 
 
